

for immediate public release

SITUATIONAL POSITION

NPCC / OPERATION TALLA

Post-Assessment Position

Date: 10 December 2025

The NPCC's National Non-Recording Practice: Evidence, Law, and Case Studies

ETHICAL APPROACH UK File Ref:

IC_10122025_NPCC_TALLA

1. Core Position Points

This brief sets out points relating to, documentary evidence in possession, that the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) operated and centrally monitored a UK-wide practice under Operation Talla whereby police forces were discouraged or instructed from recording certain

COVID-vaccine-related crime reports. Evidence also shows that suppression of crime recording was measured as a marker of “*success*”.

This practice is incompatible with:

the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS)

the Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR)

the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA)

the common-law duty not to wilfully neglect public responsibilities (*R v Dytham*)

and the Victims’ Code

Nothing in this brief is speculative. Every finding is grounded in official, verifiable documents released under FOI, formal directives issued by policing bodies, or written correspondence from officers acting under Operation Talla.

This document establishes the factual and legal foundation for parliamentary scrutiny, public accountability and formal review.

2. Key Evidence: What the Official Documents Now Show

2.1 NPCC Internal Email (14 February 2022): The “*Do Not Record*” Practice

An internal NPCC email explicitly states:

“It would appear that the guidance to not record has been a success as only one additional report has been created.”

From this single line, four facts follow:

1. There was guidance “*to not record*”.
2. The guidance was national, not force-specific.

3. Forces were monitored centrally for compliance.

4. “*Success*” was defined as near-total suppression of crime recording.

This is direct evidence of a systemic, coordinated and concealed national practice.

2.2 NPCC FOI Responses: A Public Denial

Despite the internal correspondence described above, NPCC FOI responses claimed:

“The NPCC does not hold any specific record of advice or guidance ... not to accept communications relating to Covid vaccines.”

The contradiction between the private email and the public FOI stance is stark and requires formal explanation.

2.3 Police Scotland – The Speirs Directive (25 January 2022)

Released under FOI, authored by ACC Alan Speirs, and explicitly issued:

“on the advice of the NPCC and UK Gold Command”.

It instructed officers:

not to accept vaccine-related allegations from the public

not to create crime reports

to divert such attempts into SID/CVI intelligence systems

Video evidence shows Police Scotland constables refusing to receive documents from the public because of this directive.

This is the clearest operational manifestation of the NPCC non-recording approach.

2.4 FOI 25-1037 - Confirmation of a Talla Command Structure

Police Scotland confirms:

Operation Talla had an organised, hierarchical command structure

Decisions and instructions passed through this structure

NPCC/NPoCC were recognised as part of the command ecosystem

This demonstrates that the suppression practice did not arise ad hoc - it was embedded within a national policing operation.

2.5 CRN 6029679/21 – Metropolitan Police Non-Investigation

Despite:

an estimated 400 witness and expert statements,

clear allegations of criminal offences,

confirmation by MPS officers that an investigation was active in early 2022, and

repeated submissions of evidence,

the case was closed on 21 February 2022 on grounds that:

were factually incorrect (“vaccine approval” did not exist at that time),

applied the wrong legal test (“insufficient evidence” instead of “reasonable suspicion”),

failed to engage with the submitted material,

and treated non-recording as normal procedure.

This outcome is only explicable if viewed through the lens of a national non-recording culture operating under Operation Talla.

3. Legal Duties Incompatible With a “Do Not Record” System

3.1 NCRS - The Duty to Record Crime

A crime must be recorded when:

the allegation, if true, would constitute an offence; and

there is no credible evidence to the contrary at the time of reporting.

A national practice of discouraging or preventing recording is unlawful on its face.

3.2 HOCR - Recording Must Not Be Influenced by Policy

HOCR mandates that crime recording must be:

evidence-led,

not policy-led,

and not restricted by operational preference.

A non-recording directive violates this core principle.

3.3 CPIA - Duty to Investigate and Retain Material

CPIA imposes statutory duties to:

initiate investigations,

pursue reasonable lines of inquiry,

retain materials submitted,

and act impartially.

Where recording is suppressed, CPIA compliance becomes impossible.

3.4 R v Dytham - Wilful Failure to Act

Misconduct in public office encompasses nonfeasance:

deliberate failure to perform a public duty,

where the public is harmed by that failure.

A policy or practice of non-recording aligns squarely with recognised forms of public-office misconduct.

3.5 Victims' Code - Right to Have Crime Recorded

Members of the public have a statutory right to:

have their allegations recorded as crime,

receive explanations when they are not,

and be treated lawfully and fairly.

A “*do not record*” system breaches this Code systemically.

4. Case Studies: How the Practice Operated in Reality

4.1 Case Study 1 - The Speirs Directive

Explicit prohibition on accepting evidence

Explicit prohibition on creating crime reports

Issued “*on the advice of NPCC and UK Gold Command*”

Demonstrably enforced at police station level

Identical in nature to the NPCC’s “*guidance to not record*”

This is the most transparent example of the policy in action.

4.2 Case Study 2 - CRN 6029679/21

Evidence received and acknowledged

Officers indicated an active investigation

No enquiries made

Case closed on flawed reasoning

NCRS/HOCR principles overlooked

CPIA duties unmet

The closure only coheres when viewed through the national non-recording framework.

5. Questions Now Demanding Answers

1. Did the NPCC formulate, endorse, or disseminate a practice of not recording vaccine-related crime allegations?

2. What was the nature and scope of the “guidance to not record” referenced in NPCC correspondence?

3. Which individuals or committees approved or implemented this approach?
4. How were forces' compliance levels monitored nationally?
5. How does this practice align with NCRS, HOCR, CPIA and the Victims' Code?
6. How many potential crimes were diverted away from criminal investigation?
7. What was the Home Office's precise role as the "*central link*" between Operation Talla and Government?
8. Why does the NPCC's public FOI stance contradict its internal correspondence?

These are not speculative questions. They are necessary questions arising from official documentation.

Conclusion

The evidence now available demonstrates the existence of a structured, UK-wide policing practice to suppress crime recording, divert criminal allegations and prevent statutory investigative duties from being triggered - all under the umbrella of Operation Talla.

This raises issues not simply of policing culture, but of legality, constitutional propriety and public trust.

The NPCC non-recording system is not merely an allegation, but an evidenced practice and it must now be examined publicly and transparently.

NOTE:

Responsible public engagement is desirable and ought be encouraged, in the public interest and with the aim of protecting constitutional integrity.